FORUM: Disarmament Commission

QUESTION OF: Measures to Regulate Mutual Assured Destruction and the Development of Nuclear Arms

MAIN-SUBMITTER: United Kingdom

CO-SUBMITTER: France, Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Russia, Hungary, Greece, Iraq, South Africa, Cambodia, Portugal

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISION,

*Realizing the fact that* a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender,

*Aware of the fact that* over the past years, some countries have been found secretly expanding their nuclear technology,

*Conscious* that globally the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is slowing compared with the past 30 years.,

*Bearing in mind* that the United States and Russia now possess approximately 89 percent of the world’s total inventory of nuclear weapons and 86 percent of the stockpiled warheads available for use by the military,

*Emphasizing* that approximately 12,500 nuclear warheads are present worldwide as of January 2023,

*Fully aware of* the risk of nuclear escalation among major powers,

1. Emphasizes nations to practice Nuclear Transparency through means such as but not limited to:
2. committing a regular regulation by:
3. establishing an international Nuclear Transparency Review Committee, comprised of experts, diplomats, and representatives from non-nuclear-armed states, to oversee, evaluate, and ensure the accuracy and consistency of disclosed information,
4. requiring member states to submit their standardized nuclear transparency report, designed to encompass comprehensive data, including stockpile size, locations, safety measures, and disposal plans, no later than the 15th of each month to the United Nations,
5. developing a reporting mechanism for non-compliance or inconsistencies in nuclear transparency reports, which shall include the provision for secure and confidential reporting by member states, civil society, or the public,
6. encouraging member states to actively engage in trust-building measures, transparency, and information exchange to foster cooperation and mutual understanding in nuclear matters by:
7. convening annual roundtable discussions at the United Nations to facilitate an open exchange of views, information, and concerns regarding nuclear transparency between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states,
8. conducting information-sharing sessions between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states, where best practices, lessons learned, and challenges in nuclear transparency are discussed and addressed,
9. imposing graduated sanctions on nations that fail to adhere to nuclear transparency commitments with means such as but not limited to:
10. initial diplomatic measures, such as formal warnings and expressions of concern, to emphasize the importance of compliance,
11. progressive economic sanctions, targeting specific sectors related to nuclear activities, to exert financial pressure and incentivize corrective actions,
12. consideration of restrictions on the import and export of nuclear-related materials and technologies to discourage non-compliance,
13. collaborative efforts with the international community to suspend or limit diplomatic and economic engagements until substantial improvements in nuclear transparency are demonstrated;
14. Calls for enhanced efforts in non-proliferation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote global security through means such as, but not limited to:
15. urging all member states to strengthen their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), by:
16. requiring nuclear-armed states to reduce their nuclear arsenals by at least 15% within the next five years, with a clear and verifiable timeline,
17. stressing the need for biennial NPT Review Conferences, focused on evaluating concrete disarmament progress, enhanced verification mechanisms, and compliance with disarmament obligations,
18. urging the United Nations to initiate structured discussions with non-signatory states, addressing their specific concerns, and offering security assurances,
19. recommending the establishment of a comprehensive framework for regional non-proliferation agreements by:
20. encouraging neighboring states to engage in high-level diplomatic dialogues to establish legally binding regional non-proliferation treaties with clear, time-bound goals,
21. facilitating annual information-sharing sessions on best practices for the secure handling, transportation, and safeguarding of nuclear materials among neighboring states,
22. calling upon all member nations to regulate trade with Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) that deviate from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), aiming to impede their production of additional nuclear weapons, through measures including but not limited to:
23. collaborating with trade-related organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) to restrict NWS from importing crucial materials like Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239 necessary for nuclear weapons, thereby hindering their capacity to manufacture such weapons,
24. requesting all member nations to cease the export of materials essential for nuclear weapons, effectively curbing the potential advancement of nuclear weapons development;
25. Underlines nuclear-armed states to establish effective communication means between one another to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and misinterpretations during tense situations through means such as, but not limited to:
26. urging nuclear-armed states to collaborate on the creation of reliable crisis communication channels, including:
	* 1. dedicated communication hotlines,
		2. secure video conferences,
		3. other real-time communication methods,
27. suggesting the use of established diplomatic missions, embassies, or special liaison officers for direct and discreet communication when necessary,
28. developing bilateral and multilateral crisis management agreements, which outline procedures for de-escalation, risk reduction, and mutual consultations during crises,
29. demanding nuclear-armed states to notify one another in advance of military exercises or activities that could be misconstrued as provocative;
30. Emphasizes member states to implement robust cybersecurity measures to safeguard their nuclear command and control systems through means such as, but not limited to:
31. comprehensively assessing and enhancing the cybersecurity of member states' nuclear command and control systems, including:
	* 1. regular risk assessments,
		2. vulnerability evaluations,
		3. security updates,
	1. requesting member states to exchange best practices and lessons learned in the field of nuclear cybersecurity to collectively strengthen global security;
32. Highlights member states to educate the public, especially the youth, on the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons, promoting a culture of peace, and fostering global understanding of disarmament, by:
33. allocating resources to create and support educational programs and initiatives that focus on the history, dangers, and ethics of nuclear weapons, fostering informed awareness,
34. reinforcing the integration of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation topics into national and international school curricula and university courses, to ensure comprehensive education,
35. encouraging civil society organizations, including youth-led organizations, to actively engage in advocacy for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, by:
36. urging member states to support and facilitate the participation of civil society in international disarmament processes, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), ensuring diverse voices are heard,
37. recommending the establishment of an annual United Nations Civil Society Forum on Nuclear Disarmament, providing a platform for civil society organizations to interact with government representatives and international organizations, enhancing dialogue and cooperation,
38. encouraging nations to raise awareness of danger, especially among MEDCs and LEDCs regarding nuclear weapons to citizens in such ways but not limited to:
39. social media services,
40. television news,
41. newspapers,
42. public speeches,
43. radio broadcastings;
44. Urges Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to collaborate with organizations that manage nuclear waste such as the World Nuclear Association and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) to commit to a substantial reduction and dismantling of their nuclear stockpiles by:
	1. developing advanced technologies for safe and efficient disposal of nuclear waste, minimizing the impact on ecosystems and communities,
	2. establishing a global fund to support research and development of innovative solutions for nuclear waste disposal,
	3. calling for establishments of a platform for the exchange of information and best practices among NWS and other relevant stakeholders;
45. Recommends MEDCs to collaborate with organizations that deal with economic and military problems such as the International Economic Development Council (IEDC) and the United Nations (UN) in order to support LEDCs economically and militarily to help them overcome the potential threat from nuclear weapons in such ways but not limited to:
	1. suggesting a strategic focus on regional defense initiatives rather than providing individual nations with an array of military support systems, which may include:
		1. collaborating on the development and deployment of regional radar systems,
		2. exploring regional nuclear defense agreements to collectively establish a Nuclear Umbrella,
		3. coordinating efforts on Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) capabilities within a regional context,
	2. emphasizing targeted economic support to help LEDCs establish regionally cooperative defense systems against nuclear weapons by collaborating with organizations such as:
		1. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
		2. International Economic Development Council (IEDC).