FORUM: Disarmament Commission (DA)

QUESTION OF: Measures to Evaluate the Validity of Japan's Possession of Counterattack Ability and Increased Armaments

MAIN SUBMITTER: People’s Republic of China

CO-SUBMITTERS: Syria, Italy, Germany, Afghanistan, Portugal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Africa, Greece

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

*Reaffirming* the commitment to the United Nations Charter and its principles, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and the importance of maintaining international peace and security through disarmament and arms control measures,

*Taking into account* Japan’s actions in World War II (WWII) that led to their military policy of Senshu Boei, that maintains a purely defensive posture in the military,

*Remembering* how the destructive power of military weapons was shown in events like the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the bombing of Hiroshima,

*Lauding* the many decades from WWII on that Japan has adhered to the defensive policy of Senshu Boei,

*Concerned* with the potential military implications of modifying Senshu Boei, especially the implications for regional stability,

*Emphasizing* the difference in percentage of GDP Japan plans to allot to military efforts if counterattack-ability is implemented, which would be an increase to over 2% of the GDP, an increase of 40 to 43 trillion yen, within five years,

*Noting* the financial and military support countries such as the USA, France, Italy, Australia, and Canada have given Japan in order to help Japan realize and maintain its goals for national spending on endeavors such as controlling the effects of climate change and making the economy of Japan greener,

*Understanding* that the recent tests the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) has run on nuclear missiles, that have appeared to threaten parts of Japan, have caused anxiety regarding the long-term military plans of the DPRK,

*Emphasizing* the need for transparency and international cooperation in evaluating the validity of Japan's possession of counterattack ability and increased armaments

*Considering* the humanitarian implications of Japan's increased armaments and counterattack ability, particularly in terms of minimizing the risk of armed conflict, protecting civilian populations, and upholding humanitarian principles,

*Realizing* that holding missiles with more destructive capability provides reassurance to both a country’s government and people,

*Maintaining* that not increasing the amount of or using such weapons is an indicator that a country is dedicated to keeping international peace,

1. Encourages governments around the world to spread public awareness about the potential advantages but also the potential consequences of implementing the Japanese government’s policy of counterattack ability, using measures including but not limited to such as:
	1. Social media campaigns or messages, on platforms such as:
	2. YouTube,
	3. TikTok,
	4. Instagram;
	5. Making news articles from all sides of the issue more widely available, such as articles from:
	6. BBC,
	7. CNN,
	8. AFP;
	9. Asking NGOs to consolidate relevant information and to spread that information to the public, NGOs such as
	10. The International Safety Organization,
	11. The Arms Control Association;
2. Calls upon the government of Japan to enhance transparency and promote understanding in regional and other countries of interest in such ways but not limited to:
	1. Providing detailed information and clarification of the reasons for counterattack ability and its possession of increased armaments, using methods such as but not limited to:
	2. Reporting in aspects of purpose, nature, and scope,
	3. Providing a detailed explanation of the importance of increasing armaments toward security,
	4. Willingly making other countries aware of the general type and number of arms currently stored by the Japanese government;
	5. Inviting 3rd party NGOs for reconfirmation and sincere inspection of Japan’s increasing armaments for peaceful involvement, to:
	6. develop trust for further cooperation,
	7. provide non-biased views of the situation as a whole;
	8. Reemphasizing the commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict, alleviating concerns about:
	9. Japan’s role in potential international conflicts,
	10. providing reassurances about the self-defense-oriented goals of counterattack capability;
3. Calls for the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs to establish a joint expert panel to conduct an objective and comprehensive assessment of Japan's implementation of counterattack ability and increased armaments, considering regional security dynamics and the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation through ways such as but not limited to:
	1. Actively participating in existing regional and international disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms,
	2. encouraging the international community, including regional organizations and neighboring countries, to support the joint expert panel in its assessment by providing technical expertise, information sharing, and financial resources,
	3. evaluation of feasible and possibilities before acting,
	4. further advice and skepticism to be resolved together,
	5. creating possible task plans for increased armament and further reassurances for feasibility terms;
4. Further requests Japan to explore diplomatic and peaceful means to address security concerns and promote regional stability, including means such as but not limited to:
	1. engaging in dialogue and cooperation with neighboring countries for further discussion of beneficial terms,
	2. addressing security challenges by enhancing regional cooperation and dialogue among countries in the region,
	3. deciding to convene a high-level conference on regional security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region to discuss and exchange views on the validity of Japan’s counterattack ability and increased armaments, in order to build trust and to promote disarmament and non-proliferation;
5. Suggests that Japan lower its projected expenditure on military advancement, which would include expenses for training personnel, maintaining the quality of arms bought, and purchasing arms from other countries, in order to:
6. Mitigate concerns about Japan’s future plans for potential military development and action against countries such as but not limited to:
	1. The People’s Republic of China (PRC),
	2. The DPRK,
	3. The Russian Federation (RF);
7. Continue to maintain their commitment to financing national efforts to better their economy and the world, including but not limited to commitments to:
	1. Countering the effects of climate change and making the Japanese economy greener,
	2. Not implementing tax increments or spending cuts because of the far-reaching economic impact of COVID-19 on the Japanese populace;

6. Implores countries such as but not limited to France, Italy, Canada, Australia, and the USA to reduce giving or loaning money or arms to Japan, for reasons such as but not limited to:

1. Letting Japan maintain its sovereignty over its own country and people, for an increased reliance on international funds could result in:
	1. Overextension of national finances resulting in debt,
	2. Foreign powers having too much of an influence over where the money they loan is spent on, resulting in a reduction in Japanese sovereignty over their own policy;
2. Making sure that, should Japan decide to implement counterattack ability, doing so would require a much more significant amount of domestic capital, so that:
	1. Japan would have a more conservative, gradual approach to increasing the budget allocated to the military
	2. An evolution to a stance on international action similar to the position taken by Japan during WWII and before would be avoided;
3. Making sure that Japan does not have an excessive number of arms that could be used against other countries, arms such as:
	1. Intercontinental nuclear ballistic (ICBM), because of their immense destructive capability,
	2. Tomahawk land missiles because of their versatile capabilities;

7. Suggests the DPRK to stop or reduce military testing or actions that would cause Japan to believe that implementing the counterattack ability would be necessary, including but not limited to actions such as:

1. Choosing unpopulated areas in the South China Sea when testing missiles, preventing further casualties,
2. Reducing the number of missiles tested in general, because of the concern caused by the large number of missiles tested, especially the near-100 amount tested in 2022,
3. Complying with the UN ban on ballistic missile testing stated in Resolution 1695, which would negate Japan’s concerns about another missile testing incident entirely;

8. Urges Japan to not implement counterattack ability as the current plan for their National Security Strategy suggests, instead putting into effect provisions such as but not limited to:

1. Increasing the military budget, a smaller amount over a longer period, for example, ten years, to avoid:
	1. The advent of the military affairs too heavily influencing domestic policy,
	2. Concerns from countries about the possible plans Japan may have with a more powerful military;
2. Reaffirming the intentions of the Japanese government to use military force only as a last resort, so that Japan would modify, but still firmly keep in line with the Senshu Boei policy,
3. Using a limited amount of international funds, primarily relying on Japan’s own government to fund the projected increases in military spending;

9. Encourages Japan to have publicity and signed declarations as terms for reassuring member nations of its purpose for peaceful involvement instead of using it offensively, including terms such as but not limited to:

1. Setting consequences by the UN if any armaments for counterattack capability are used offensively, consequences such as but not limited to:
	1. Taking away the right for weaponry producing,
	2. Paying to rebuild or reconstruct if a large amount of damage has been done;
2. Holding Japan accountable to international law and the consequences associated with breaking it, laws and regulations such as:
	1. The United Nations Charter,
	2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons.