

FORUM: Disarmament Commission

QUESTION OF: Measures to strengthen the international regulation and oversight of nuclear weapons.

MAIN SUBMITTER: Federative Republic of Brazil

CO-SUBMITTERS: The Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Republic of Kenya, The Republic of Chile and The Argentine Republic

The Disarmament Commission,

Reconfirming that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

Noting the importance of the IAEA and its safeguards system for verification of compliance with non-proliferation commitments cannot be over-emphasized,

Deeply concerned about the slow progress in implementing the key remaining disarmament initiatives and the persisting threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Stressing that any process towards nuclear disarmament needs to be practical, verifiable, and sequenced to enhance security for all states,

Recognizing that the whole population of the globe is affected by nuclear weapons, as they have devastating immediate and long-term effects,

Aware that the devastating immediate long-term effect includes physical destruction of buildings, severe burns, blindness, and death from shock and heat,

Further aware that in zones around the area of the blast, whole populations may be destroyed, creating biological dead zones in which species may not recover for decades, leading to their extinction,

1. **Calls upon** all States to take immediate and concrete steps to strengthen the NPT regime by:
 - a) Urging all States not party to the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions,
 - b) Encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the implementation of their Article VI (clause within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) disarmament obligations through further verifiable reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, not limited to:
 - i. Strategic-range systems,

- ii. Non-strategic (tactical) systems,
 - iii. Those held in active stockpiles,
 - iv. Those held in reserved, inactive stockpiles;
 - c) Enhancing transparency in their nuclear arsenals and doctrines by:
 - i. Publicly disclosing their total stockpile size,
 - ii. Providing detailed breakdowns of their delivery systems,
 - iii. Clarifying the circumstances under which they would consider the use of nuclear weapons;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a Group of Governmental Experts, in order to consider ways and means for resuming negotiations for the conclusion of a verifiable FMCT, with a mandate to:
- a) Review technical issues and verification procedures which would apply to such a treaty, including Methods for monitoring and verifying the shutdown of fissile material production facilities but not limited to:
 - i. Environmental sampling techniques,
 - ii. Remote monitoring with sealed cameras,
 - iii. The role of periodic and challenge inspections,
 - b) Through the submission of a report with recommendations to the general assembly:
 - i. Draft of treaty text for consideration,
 - ii. A detailed outline of a proposed verification protocol;
3. Calls for all member states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay to facilitate its early into force, and pending its entry into force:
- a) Calls for the further restraint on nuclear weapon test explosions, with a view to discounting such explosions entirely,
 - b) Calls upon all member states to support the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, including its International Monitoring System by fully funding completion and maintenance of but not limited to:
 - i. Seismic stations,
 - ii. Radionuclide stations,
 - iii. Hydroacoustic stations,
 - iv. Infrasound stations;
 - c) Facilitating the timely certification of all monitoring stations on their territory;
4. Emphasizes the critical role of the International Atomic Energy Agency but not limited to:
- a) Increased Voluntary Financial and Technical Contributions to the IAEA so as to Enhance its capabilities to:

- i. Detection and deterrence of undeclared nuclear activities,
 - ii. Development and deployment of advanced environmental sampling technology,
 - iii. Improving satellite imagery analysis capability,
 - iv. Training for inspectors in novel verification methodologies;
 - b) Effectively implement state-level safeguards approaches by:
 - i. Developing state-specific factors for evaluation,
 - ii. Improving information analysis and integration techniques;
 - c) Universalization of the Additional protocol as a new standard for comprehensive safeguards agreements by making its adoption a condition for:
 - i. Transfers of any nuclear-related technology or equipment,
 - ii. Membership in international nuclear cooperation consortia;
5. Recommends strengthening international regulation and laws in collaboration with NGO, which can further help with issues such as, but not limited to:
- a) Calls for the further restraint on nuclear weapon test explosions, with a view to discounting such explosions entirely by making international laws that could limit nuclear weapons that is illegal such as:
 - i. Banning the possession of nuclear weapons,
 - ii. Stricter Licensing and Tracking of Nuclear Materials;
 - b) Improved regulation requiring the IAEA to take up its new role and responsibility in putting into place real-time monitoring with clearly defined legal consequences;
 - c) Encourage openness, confidence, and regional cooperation as tools for building confidence and preventing secret nuclear weapons programs:
 - i. Working with NGOs to increase public awareness of nuclear dangers,
 - ii. Utilize real-time monitoring with sensors, satellite imagery, and tracking systems, along with maintaining international databases of fissile materials;
6. Encourages further development and use of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a measure contributing to the strengthening of global non-proliferation and disarmament norms but not limited to:
- a) Welcomes the ratification of the treaties establishing such zones,
 - b) Calls upon all Nuclear-Weapon States to sign and ratify the relevant protocols to these treaties, thereby providing negative security assurances to zonal states by legally binding themselves by:

- i. Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states within the zone,
 - ii. Respect the status of the zone;
- 7. Urges international government and co-operate with them to make a key international framework for nuclear proliferation that prevents and slows the transition to nuclear weapons develop such as but not limited to:
 - a) International governments to cooperate with:
 - i. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
 - ii. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
 - iii. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW);
 - b) Forbid and take active efforts to prevent, and where necessary prohibit, the intentional transfer of technical, procedural, or operational information that could contribute significantly to the design, construction, acquisition, or illicit trafficking of nuclear explosive devices or nuclear usable material through:
 - i. The mandatory establishment of national export control lists aligned with the Nuclear Supplies Group guidelines,
 - ii. Enhanced border security protocols such as radiation detection portals at major ports of entry, specialized training for customs officials on identifying dual-nuclear components;
- 8. Confirms full implementation of the NPT by all member states and urges the adoption of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA for greater transparency into the nuclear activities of States Parties, including but not limited to:
 - a) Increase funding and resources for the IAEA's safeguards and nuclear security programs to ensure effective verification mechanisms and guarantee only peaceful usage of nuclear energy:
 - i. Financial contribution of Member States to the different IAEA programs concerning verification strengthening and security enhancement,
 - ii. Utilize the latest technologies, like satellite monitoring and environmental sampling, in order to reach the violations of nuclear safeguards,
 - iii. Expand its outreach programs to ensure that developing countries have the necessary infrastructure and capacity for nuclear security;
 - b) Enhanced International cooperation on nuclear security, principally through joint initiatives and a sharing of research to enhance global non-proliferation efforts:
 - i. Participate in multilateral frameworks for research and development of advanced nuclear security technologies,

- ii. Establish global networks for sharing best practices, technical expertise, and training on nuclear security protocols.DA_