FORUM: General Assembly

QUESTION OF: Measure to Address the Spread of Misinformation in the Digital World

MAIN-SUBMITTED BY: Thailand

CO-SUBMITTED BY: Albania, Algeria, Canada, Croatia, New Zealand, Nigeria, United Kingdom Great Britain and Northern Ireland

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Recognizing that the digital world has become a primary arena for public argues, civic participation, and the exercise of democratic rights,

Deeply concerned by the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation, which undermines public trust, threatens democratic processes, incites violence, and endangers social cohesion,

Acknowledging that misinformation disproportionately affects developing countries with limited digital literacy infrastructure and regulatory capacity,

Emphasizing that economic insecurity and social fragility create conditions in which disinformation thrives, and that measures addressing misinformation must be coordinated with efforts to promote sustainable development,

Noting with concern the absence of clear, enforceable international standards governing the transparency and accountability of digital platforms,

Encouraging the establishment of a voluntary international framework for digital platform transparency, algorithmic accountability, and political advertising disclosure,

1. Encourages Member States to strengthen cooperation with UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNSECO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and other relevant international agencies through:
    a) Establishing reliable information platforms ad resources that allow citizens to verify information encountered online, including,

i. The government works with UNDP and UNSECO to ascertain information about AI and technology,
ii. Collaborating with WHO (World Health Organization) to provide accurate and verified medical information, including disease prevention, general treatment methods, medication safety, and the effects of different nutritional supplement and ingredients;

b) Encouraging the government to make sure the misinformation gets to them as soon as possible, so that the government and other agencies can check for any disinformation before the news spreads;
i. Providing training programs for relevant authorities and designated personnel on identifying and tracing the spread of disinformation across social media platforms through publicly available digital information,
ii. The member states to develop a new social media or AI app that has already been linked to the government. This way, the government will be able to have full access to the app, allowing them to expose disinformation before it spreads too much that the government can't stop it;

2. Calls upon the government to develop a framework or a plan to reduce the frequency misinformation and disinformation appearance by:
a) Encouraging the government to hire workers that can help find people who have been spreading disinformation,
i. Encourages the government to use the digital infrastructure tracking work; a way to find disinformation actors by following left clues on websites and on social media,
ii. Calls upon the governments to delete all the websites and accounts used by the disinformation actor, so that no other people can use it,
iii. Inform websites and platforms to add fact-checking systems that help social media platforms or websites avoid misinformation posting,
iv. Strongly recommends the government to use the international response framework; a special technology where the apps report the disinformation

to the government, and special detectives start finding digital footprints to find the actor,

b) Highly recommending the Member States to develop advanced technology to work out of technological framework,
    i. Urges the member states to find a highly skilled detective who is able to track digital footprints precisely and correctly,
    ii. Recommends government working with cyber police to protect social media safety and prevent abusive language posted;

3. Calls upon all Member States to develop and implement comprehensive national strategies for digital media literacy, prioritizing education, public awareness, and community-based resilience programs through:
    a) Integrating digital and media literacy into national school curricula at the primary and secondary levels, with emphasis on,
        i. Critical evaluation of online information sources, including verification of authorship, publication dates, domain registration records, and cross-referencing of claims against established fact-checking databases and primary source documents,
        ii. Recognizing coordinated disinformation tactics, including bots spreading content, deepfakes and low-tech fakes, and emotional manipulation that uses outrage to bypass rational scrutiny,
        iii. Making Laws of being a responsible and ethical digital citizen, including understanding the legal consequences of sharing harmful or inflammatory content online, and the public responsibility to report organized fake activity to national authorities and platform safety teams,
        iv. Basic technical literacy regarding algorithmic curation, including how recommendation systems prioritize engagement over accuracy and how filter bubbles reinforce pre-existing beliefs,
    b) Launching sustained online public awareness campaigns targeting vulnerable populations, including,

i. Elderly citizens, who are disproportionately exposed to online fraud and health-related misinformation, through community workshops, traditional media outreach, and partnerships with senior centers and religious institutions,
ii. Teenagers, who are primary consumers of social media content and targets of radicalization through disinformation, through peer-to-peer education programs, platform-native awareness tools, and school-based digital ambassadors,
iii. Rural and low-connectivity communities, where access to verification tools is limited, through mobile SMS verification services, radio-based fact-checking segments, and community information hubs,
iv. Migrant communities, who are frequently targeted by disinformation from their home countries, through outreach in their own language and culture, coordinated with community organizations,

c) Establishing national digital literacy task forces composed of educators, civil society representatives, technology experts, journalists, and government officials to coordinate implementation and monitor progress, with,
i. A mandate to publish annual public reports on literacy levels, program effectiveness, and gaps in coverage, disaggregated by region, age group, and socioeconomic status,
ii. Authority to recommend curriculum updates based on emerging disinformation trends, with a requirement to review curricula at least every two years,
iii. Representation from marginalized communities, including linguistic minorities and persons with disabilities, to ensure inclusive program design and accessible materials,
iv. A dedicated funding stream, protected from annual budgetary volatility, to ensure multi-year program continuity;

4. Encourages the creation of voluntary international guidelines to improve transparency of digital platforms by:

a) Creating transparency reports that show,
    i. The amount misinformation has been removed or flagged, broken down by category, country, and language, and how much was removed by an automated system,
    ii. How decisions were made, including what policies were used, what evidence was needed for action, and what appeals are available,
    iii. Where the actions have been taken, including if any minority languages, political dissidents, or vulnerable groups were disproportionately impacted, and explaining why,
    iv. How many coordinated inauthenticity networks have been detected and removed, how many accounts, pages, and groups have been impacted, and how many people they reached,
b) Requiring platforms to show how their recommendations work such as deep-learning AI systems which would include:
    i. What factors are considered when deciding what to recommend, including what engagement factors are being used, how much weight they have, and if there are any changes for public interest content such as health information or election information,
    ii. If any content is prioritized or deprioritized based on political, social, or commercial factors, including paid promotion, partnerships, or Government takedown requests,
    iii. Preventing biased recommendations, including independent audits, bias testing, and publishing audit results in machine-readable format,
    iv. If there are any virality thresholds, how many times the content needs to be shared, and what happens when it reaches this threshold;
c) Creating a public register for political advertising, which would include:
    i. Who the advert was from and who paid for it, with those spending over a certain amount needing to be verified, including showing who owns the organization,
    ii. Who the advert was targeted at, including microtargeting based on political affiliation, age ranges, and location,

iii. How much was spent and how long the advert ran for, updated in real-time and stored for a minimum of five years, including an API for independent researchers,

iv. A standardized label for political adverts, showing who the advert was from and linking to the register,

5. Recommends the creation of an UN-backed capacity-building initiative to support Member States, particularly developing countries, in building their capacity and work together to combat misinformation, which is causing significant chaos on the digital community, which would include:

    a) A voluntary fund and resources, especially done by UNESCO, UNDP, and NGOs to,

        i. provide capacity building and training to regulators, teachers, and factcheckers in developing countries, with priority given to least developed countries, small island developing states, and conflict-affected states

        ii. create open-source verification and fact-checking tools, available to adapt under a permissive license,

        iii. create regional research centers, which must publish peer-reviewed research and share their data,

        iv. provide grants to countries in crisis, including during elections and public health emergencies,

    b) Enabling peer-to-peer support between Member States' representatives, which would include:

        i. secondments, including clear terms of reference, knowledge transfer, and reporting progress to relevant government member,

        ii. training for fact checkers and journalists, including simulation and tabletop exercises;

        iii. sharing data on cross-border disinformation, including anonymizing the data;

iv. regional communities of practice, bringing regulators, platforms, and civil society together every quarter to share threat intelligence;

c) Inviting the ITU, UNESCO, and UNDP to provide technical support, which would include,
    i. creating model regulation that can be adapted to fit different legal systems, including toolkits and model legislation,
    ii. maintaining a global database of national digital literacy curriculums, including translations and effectiveness,
    iii. hosting an annual conference bringing together multiple stakeholders to discuss new threats of disinformation, including synthetic media, AI-generated content, and cross-platform coordinated disinformation,
d) Inviting regional organizations to work together to identify, flag, and combat cross-border coordinated disinformation, which would include:
    i. regional rapid response to identify and flag coordinated inauthenticity across borders, including identifying common signs of bots, misinformation post,
    ii. regional factchecking helps by pooling resources, standardizing verifications, and creating joint reports,
    iii. regional standards for platforms, including mutually recognizing transparency reports,

6. Urges all Member States to strengthen laws to hold accountable any entity willingly spreading harmful misinformation, without restricting the freedom of expression by:
    a) Defining penalties to various types of harmful misinformation, which would include,
        i. Encouraging fines for misinformation activities that aim to mislead and cause harm, including misinformation spread online or offline and domestic politically funded campaigns,
        ii. Addressing people or organizers who accidentally share misinformation with education, which should not be criminalized,

iii. Restricting political speech, satirical content, and editorial content, which should be criminalized under international human rights law and proportional guidelines, through account suspension

b) Setting appropriate punishments, which would include,
    i. Fines for platforms who do not comply with transparency rules, based on global revenue per year,
    ii. Civil penalties for any entities knowingly funding or coordinating disinformation, including asset freezes and director disqualifications,
    iii. Criminal penalties only if the disinformation incites violence, authorized by the judiciary, with convictions made public and an appeal available,
c) Ensuring Judicial and comply with National laws oversight, which would include,
    i. The right to appeal decisions relating to moderation or regulation, with decisions published with reasoning and time limits to ensure content is not removed indefinitely,
    ii. Transparent judicial proceedings relating to disinformation, except in very specific circumstances relating to national security, which would need to be independently reviewed,
    iii. Preventing abuse of anti-disinformation laws to silence political opinions, requiring independent human rights bodies to review the laws and audits to see if there are any patterns of politically biased enforcement,
d) Promoting legal protection for journalists, factcheckers, and civil society, which would include,
    i. Shield laws to stop them being forced to reveal their sources, with an exception only in extreme circumstances where someone's life is at risk, applying to digital communications and metadata
    ii. Fast-tracking cases relating to harassment, with strict time limits for initial hearings
    iii. Public statements condemning threats to media professionals from heads of state and senior officials, and a safety fund at national and regional level to help with emergency support, relocation, and legal defense

iv. Independent monitoring bodies to oversee the use of SLAPPs and identify patterns of coordinated online harassment, able to recommend changes to legislation and refer to the relevant authorities;

7. Encourages the establishment of a voluntary international framework to increase transparency for digital platforms, such as YouTube, TikTok, Instagram and many others , specifically by:
    a. Requiring platforms to publish regular transparency reports detailing,
        i. The volume and nature of content removed or flagged for misinformation, disaggregated by category, country, language,
        ii. Where moderation actions happened and who they affected, including any disproportionate effects on different language communities, or marginalized groups, with explanations for any disparities found,
        iii. The volume of coordinated abusive behavior networks detected and removed, including the number of accounts, pages, and groups affected, and the estimated reach of such networks prior to removal,
    b. Mandating disclosure of algorithmic recommendation systems including,
        i. The factors that determine content amplification and reach, including engagement-based ranking signals, their relative weights, and any adjustments made for public-interest content such as health information or election coverage,
        ii. Any mechanisms that are prioritized such as social media contents, offline promotion based on political, social, or commercial considerations, including paid promotion, partnership agreements,
        iii. Protection against bias in algorithms that may spread harmful or misleading content, including regular independent audits.